We …nd that di¤erences in the ability to devote cognitive resources to a strategic interaction imply di¤erences in strategic behavior. In our experiment, we manipulate the availability of cognitive resources by applying a di¤erential cognitive load. In cognitive load experiments, subjects are directed to perform a task which occupies cognitive resources, in addition to making a choice in another domain. The greater the cognitive resources required for the task implies that fewer such resources will be available for deliberation on the choice. Although much is known about how subjects make decisions under a cognitive load, little is known about how this a¤ects behavior in strategic games. We run an experiment in which subjects play a repeated multi-player prisoner's dilemma game under two cognitive load treatments. In one treatment, subjects are placed under a high cognitive load (given a 7 digit number to recall) and subjects in the other are placed under a low cognitive load (given a 2 digit number). We …nd that the individual behavior of the subjects in the low load condition converges to the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium prediction at a faster rate than those in the high load treatment. However, we do not …nd the corresponding relationship involving outcomes in the game. Speci…cally, there is no evidence of a signi…cantly di¤erent convergence of game outcomes across treatments. As an explanation of these two results, we …nd evidence that low load subjects are better able to adjust their choice in response to outcomes in previous periods.
Introduction
There have been advancements in the understanding of play in games based on the conceptualization that players devote heterogenous levels of cognition to deliberation on their strategy Wilson, 1994, 1995; Nagel, 1995; Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Camerer et al., 2004) .
These advancements specify that the players exhibit heterogenous levels of strategic sophistication. In particular, it is conceptualized that higher levels within the hierarchy are associated with greater sophistication. This conceptualization is often supported by observing play in a game and determining whether the hierarchical model improves the …t with the observations. In addition to comparing the predictions with the observations, these models are also supported by the measurement of data related to the level of cognition. For instance studies measuring the decision to lookup relevant and available information, 1 eyetracking studies which measure the location of the attention of the subject, 2 and even neurological data 3 have been seen as providing evidence in support of these hierarchical models.
In a rough sense, these papers ask the questions, "Are there brains in games?" and "If so, what else can we say?" In our paper, rather than measure the level of cognition or measure data related to the level cognition, we manipulate the level of cognition. In this sense, the present paper is another way of asking, "Are there brains in games?" and "If so, what else can we say?"
In the experiment described below, we …nd a relationship between the heterogenous ability to devote cognitive resources to a strategic interaction and behavior in the interaction. This heterogeneity arises because we apply a di¤erential cognitive load on subjects who are playing the game. In cognitive load experiments, subjects are directed to perform a memorization task in parallel to making a choice in another domain. This additional memorization task occupies cognitive resources, which cannot be devoted to deliberation about the choice. In this sense, subjects under a larger cognitive load, can be thought to mimic the condition of 1 See Camerer et. al. (1993) , Johnson et. al. (2002) , Crawford (2008) , Costa-Gomes et. al. (2001) and Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) . 2 For instance, see and . 3 For instance, see Coricelli and Nagel (2009). having a diminished ability to reason.
Much is known about the behavior of subjects under a cognitive load. For instance, the literature …nds that subjects under a larger cognitive load tend to be more impulsive and less analytical. However, little is known about how the cognitive load a¤ects play in strategic games. 4 This experiment seeks to begin to clarify the relationship between cognitive load and behavior in games. Further, due to the similarity between cognitive load and the diminished ability to reason, the experiment seeks to sheds light on the relationship between intelligence and behavior in games. One might be tempted to conclude that the diminished ability to reason would generate obvious predictions; for instance that subjects under a larger cognitive load will be more cooperative in the prisoner's dilemma game. However, the predictions on this front are far from obvious due to recent …ndings of a positive relationship between the measure of intelligence and cooperation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game. 5
In our experiment, we impose a cognitive load on subjects who are playing repeated multiplayer prisoner's dilemma game. In each period, subjects are told to memorize a number. In the low load treatment, this is a small number and therefore relatively easy to remember. In the high load treatment, the number is large and therefore relatively di¢cult to remember.
The subjects then play a four-player prisoner's dilemma game. After the subjects make their choice in the game, they are asked to recall the number. As suggested above, subjects in the low load condition are better able to commit cognitive resources in order to deliberate on their action in the game.
Of course, the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the …nitely repeated multi-player prisoner's dilemma game is for each player to select the uncooperative action in every period.
As with most experimental investigations of the prisoner's dilemma game, we do not observe 4 Researchers have also studied the e¤ects of the contraints on the complexity of strategies on outcomes in the …nitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game. For instance, see Neyman (1985 Neyman ( , 1998 . Also see Béal (2010) for a more recent reference. Our study can be thought to perform a similar exercise in the laborary. 5 For instance, see Jones (2008). this. We do …nd that the individual behavior of the subjects in the low load condition converges to the Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium prediction at a faster rate than those in the high load treatment. However, we do not …nd the corresponding relationship involving game outcomes. Speci…cally, there is no evidence of a signi…cantly di¤erent convergence of game outcomes across treatments. A potential explanation for these two results, is our …nding that subjects in the low load treatment are better able to adjust their strategy in response to the outcome in the previous period than are those in the high load treatment. As a result, they are better able to identify advantageous, temporary situations in which additional surplus could be captured. Further, this agility o¤sets the trend towards playing uncooperatively.
These results combine to suggest that the availability of cognitive resources a¤ects strategic behavior.
Related Literature
A typical cognitive load experiment would direct subjects to engage in a task which would require mental e¤ort, in addition to making a choice in a di¤erent domain. One treatment would be given a relatively easy task (low load treatment) and the other would be given a relatively di¢cult task (high load treatment). The experimenter would then measure the di¤erences in behavior between the treatments. This literature …nds that subjects under a larger cognitive load tend to be more impulsive and less analytical because those in the high load treatment are less able to devote cognitive resources to re ‡ect on their decision.
For instance, Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) describe an experiment in which subjects were given an option of eating an unhealthy cake or a healthy serving of fruit. The authors found that the subjects were more likely to select the cake rather than the fruit when they were under the high cognitive load.
Much is known about how the cognitive load a¤ects subjects in nonstrategic settings.
In addition to being more impulsive and less analytical (Hinson et. al., 2003) it has been found that subjects under a cognitive load tend to be more risk averse and exhibit a higher degree of time impatience (Benjamin et. al., 2006) , make more mistakes (Ryvdal, 2007) , have less self control (Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999; Ward and Mann, 2000) , fail to process available information (Gilbert et. al., 1988; Swann et. al., 1990) , perform worse on gambling tasks (Hinson et. al. 2002) , are more susceptible to a social label (Cornelissen et. al., 2007) , and have di¤erent evaluations of the fairness of outcomes (Cornelissen et. al., 2011; van den Bos et. al., 2006; Hauge et. al., 2009 ).
There is a literature which examines the relationship between the level of cognition and play in games, without explicitly manipulating the cognitive load. For instance, Chen et. al.
(2009) measure the working memory of subjects and examine behavior in double auctions.
The authors …nd some evidence that subjects with a higher working memory perform better. Devetag and Warglien (2003) …nd a relationship between the working memory capacity of a subject and the congruence of play to that predicted by equilibrium. Also Bednar et. al.
(2010) describe an experiment in which subjects simultaneously play two distinct games with di¤erent opponents. 6 The authors …nd that behavior in a particular game is a¤ected by corresponding paired game.
However, to our knowledge, there are only two papers which investigate the relationship between the manipulation of cognitive load and behavior in games, Roch et. al. (2000) and Cappelletti et. al. (2008) . Roch et. al. (2000) found that subjects under the low cognitive load condition requested more resources in a common resource game. However, in Roch et.
al. the subjects were not told the penalty if the sum of the group's requests were more than the amount to be divided. As a result, one cannot determine whether the cognitive load manipulation implied di¤erences in strategic behavior or simply di¤erences in the regard for norms which are not incentivized. Cappelletti et. al. (2008) study behavior in the ultimatum game and vary the ability of the subject to deliberate by manipulating time pressure and cognitive load. The authors …nd that time pressure a¤ects the behavior of both proposer and responder. However, the authors …nd that cognitive load does not a¤ect behavior as either a proposer or responder.
In contrast, we …nd that cognitive load does a¤ect behavior in our setting. The di¤erence in e¢cacy of the manipulation is likely due to the di¤erences in the incentivization of the memorization task. We discuss this issue further below.
There is a recent interest in the relationship between intelligence and preferences. 7 This literature …nds a negative relationship between intelligence and both risk aversion and time impatience. Note the similarity to the …ndings in the cognitive load literature. Therefore, to the extent that manipulating cognitive load is analogous to manipulating the intelligence of the subject, we now discuss the small literature on the relationship between intelligence and behavior in games. Burnham et. al. (2009) demonstrate a relationship between a measure of intelligence and strategic behavior in a beauty contest game. In other words, the authors …nd that subjects with a higher measure of intelligence select actions which are closer to the Nash Equilibrium of the beauty contest.
On the other hand, Jones (2008) …nds a relationship between cooperation in the repeated prisoner's dilemma and the average SAT scores at the university where the experiment was conducted. 8 In other words, Jones …nds a negative relationship between a measure of intelligence and strategic behavior in the prisoner's dilemma game.
Therefore, to the extent that an increased cognitive load simulates the e¤ect of a reduced ability to reason, the two papers discussed above would seem to make opposite predictions in our setting. Burnham et. al. (2009) would seem to predict that subjects in the high load treatment will exhibit more cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game and Jones (2008) would seem to predict that outcomes in the high load treatment will exhibit less cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game. The experiment which we describe below will help distinguish between these two predictions.
The answer, as it turns out, is a bit more subtle. Across all periods, we …nd little di¤erence between either the individual behavior or the game outcomes of the subjects in the high and low load treatments. However, we …nd that the individual behavior of the low load subjects converge to the SPNE behavior at a faster rate than high load subjects. We also …nd that subjects in the low load treatment are better able to condition on past outcomes than are high load subjects.
Finally, note that economists have become interested in studying the response times of subjects. 9 Research has found that longer response times are associated with more strategic and less automatic reasoning. As we are manipulating the ability of the subjects to devote cognitive resources to the problem, the response time will prove to be a useful measure in its e¢cacy. In other words, we use the response time as a measure of the cognitive resources devoted to the problem.
Method
A total of 60 subjects participated in the experiment. The subjects were graduate and undergraduate students of Rutgers University-Camden. The experiment was conducted in two sessions of 16, one session of 12, and two sessions of 8. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) .
Subjects were matched with three other subjects in which they were to play a repeated prisoner's dilemma game. The subjects were told that the group would remain …xed throughout the experiment. 10 The individual decision was to select X (the cooperative action) or Y (the uncooperative action). Of the four subjects in the group, if x play X, and 4 x play Y then selecting X yields a payo¤ of 20x points whereas selecting Y yields 20x + 40. The exchange rate was $1 for every 150 points. Additionally, the subjects were paid a $5 show-up fee. While making a decision in the game, the subjects were provided with the payo¤s matrix in two forms, which they were told are identical. See the appendix for the screen shown to the subjects during their decision in the game.
Before play in each period, the subject was given 15 seconds in which to commit a number to memory. The subjects were aware that they would be asked to recall the number after their choice was made in the game. There were two cognitive load treatments: in the low load treatment subjects were directed to memorize a 2 digit number, and in the high load treatment subjects were directed to memorize a 7 digit number. There were 26 subjects in the low load treatment and 34 in the high load treatment. The subjects were told that they would only receive payment in periods in which they correctly recalled the number and that they would receive nothing for the periods in which they incorrectly recalled their number.
After each period, subjects were given feedback regarding play in the game, however they were given no information about their performance on the memorization task. Across all treatments, the composition of 12 of the 15 groups were homogenous, in that they contained only a single load treatment. However, there were 3 groups which were mixed in the sense that that 2 subjects were in the low load treatment and 2 were in the high load treatment.
We refer to this group as mixed. The subjects were told nothing about the composition of their group.
To summarize the timing in each period, subjects were given the number (7 digits of 2 digits), they made their choice in the game, they were asked to recall the number, and they were given feedback on the game outcome but not the memorization task outcome. Each of these stages were designed so that the subject would not proceed to the next stage until each subject completes the prior stage. This procedure was repeated for 30 periods, with a new number in each period. The amount earned by the subjects ranged from $6:47 to $20:20, with a mean of $14:76.
At the conclusion of period 30, the subjects answered the following questions on a scale of 1 to 7: Which featured into your decisions between X and Y , your prudent side or your impulsive side (1 prudent, 7 impulsive)? How di¢cult was it for you to recall your numbers
(1 very di¢cult, 7 not very di¢cult)? How di¢cult was it for you to decide between X and Y (1 very di¢cult, 7 not very di¢cult)? How distracting was the memorization task (1 very distracting, 7 not very distracting)? and How many of the memorization tasks do you expect that you correctly answered (1 none correct, 7 all correct)?
The z-Tree output speci…ed the time remaining when the Click to Proceed button was pressed. In the output, there appeared instances of a time remaining of 99999. This output seems to have occurred if the "Click to Proceed" button was pressed before the clock could begin. In the stage in which the number was given, we recorded the 56 instances of an output of 99999 as 16 because there were 15 seconds allotted. In the stage in which the game was played, we recorded the 2 instances of an output of 99999 as 31 because there were 30 seconds to decide.
Discussion of the Experimental Design
Before we get into the results, we discuss some issues related to the design of the experiment.
Although the cognitive load manipulation is rather common, to our knowledge, we are the only example of a paper in which the manipulation is repeated. As a result, it was not obvious to us whether we should balance the experiment so that each subject would undergo the high and low loads an equal number of times. However, we decided to keep the subjects in a single treatment throughout the experiment. In part, this decision was due to the results in Dewitte et. al. (2005) which reports that the e¤ects of the cognitive load manipulation can be lasting.
Also note that we decided to use a 7 digit number as the high load manipulation because it is standard in the literature and because Miller (1956) …nds that this tends to be near the limit of the memory of subjects. 11
Also note that the bulk of the cognitive load literature does not incentivise the memorization task. To our knowledge, Benjamin et. al. (2006) (2008), we provide no feedback regarding the accuracy of the memorization task. We make 1 1 Also, see Cowan (2001) for an updated view on the memory capacity literature.
these two design decisions in order to reduce the ability of the subject to strategically allocate cognitive resources. In particular, we want to avoid providing an incentive for the subject to
seek an interior solution to the trade-o¤ of cognitive resources for the memorization task and deliberation on the game.
We designed the experiment so that the subject would only enter the following stage when all other players completed the current stage. This was done in order to mitigate the ability of the subjects to strategically decide the timing of their decisions. In other words, due to our experimental design, there was little incentive for the subjects in the low load condition to quickly leave the stage where they are given their number because they would not immediately proceed to the game stage. Additionally, the subjects in the high load condition could not quickly make their decision in the prisoner's dilemma game, in order to spill their number in the memorization task, because they would not immediately proceed to the relevant stage.
We study the four-player prisoner's dilemma 12 because it has a few attractive features for the purpose of examining the role of cognitive load in strategic games. The game is relatively simple because the decision is binary and the game is linear. For the sake of simplicity, we did not elect to use a more general public goods game. However, the four-player version requires more thought than the two-player version because outcomes depend on the actions of three, and not just one, opponent. Further, most of the subjects are familiar with the two-player version and would likely import this prior experience into the experiment. For this reason, we employed the four-player version.
Results
All …ve of the manipulation check questions demonstrated signi…cant di¤erences between the high and low load treatments. Speci…cally, those in the high load treatment reported being more impulsive (p = 0:038), having more di¢culty in recalling the number (p < 0:001), having more di¢culty in deciding on an action in the game (p = 0:098), found the memorization task to be more distracting (p < 0:001), and expected to correctly recall the number with lower precision (p = 0:005) than those in the low load treatment. 13 Further, the subjects in the high load spent a signi…cantly longer time committing the number to memory (M = 9:15, SD = 4:93) than did the subjects in the low load treatment (M = 1:19, SD = 2:20), t(1798) = 42:1, p < 0:001.
We now begin the analysis of the individual behavior of the subjects. To do so, we perform a series of logistic regressions with the choice in the game as the dependent variable. Here a value of 1 indicates that the cooperative action (X) was selected and 0 indicates that that the uncooperative action (Y ) was selected. We use a type dummy where 1 indicates the low load treatment and 0 indicates the high load treatment. We use a dummy variable indicating whether the group was mixed and therefore contained subjects from both the high and low load treatments. Finally, we use a dummy variable indicating whether the memorization task in that period was correct or incorrect. Note that the regressions below account for the subject-speci…c …xed-e¤ects and each have n = 1800. See Table 1 for the results of these regressions.
(1) where *** indicates signi…cance at 0.01
First, note that there is strong evidence of learning across periods. In every speci…cation involving the period, our results indicate that subjects played less cooperatively across time. In other words, perhaps not surprisingly, we see convergence to the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium behavior. Although perhaps surprisingly, across periods, there was little di¤erence between the choice of subjects in the high and low treatments. In each of the four speci…cations involving the low type dummy, the variable does not achieve signi…cance.
However, the di¤erences between the treatments emerge when we account for time. The actions of the subjects in the high load treatment converged to the equilibrium behavior at faster rate than those in the low load treatment. This relationship continues to hold when we account for the mixed nature of the groups or whether the subject correctly preformed the memorization task in that period. Hence, there was convergence to the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium behavior for all types, however the convergence was faster for the low load subjects.
One potential explanation for the faster convergence for the low load treatment is that the high load treatment, due to the di¤erential di¢culty of the memorization task, expects to earn less money than the low load treatment. As a result, the behavior of the high load subjects converge to the low paying equilibrium prediction less quickly than the low load subjects. However regression (5) provides evidence against this possibility: there is no signi…cant relationship between choice and whether the subject correctly performed the memorization task in that period.
The natural question is then, "Are the cognitive load treatments thinking di¤erently about the game?" To answer this question, we analyze the response times of the subjects in selecting an action in the game. We run the following three regressions with the time remaining as the dependent variable In other words, the size of our dependent variable is increasing in the speed of the decision. In each regression below, we account for …xed-e¤ects and have n = 1800. The results are summarized in Table 2 .
(1)
( Again there appears to be a great deal of learning across periods. In both speci…cations in which the period is included, there is a positive relationship between the period and the speed of the decision. This suggests that as the experiment proceeded, the game decision became more automatic and required fewer cognitive resources. The results of the regressions involving type suggest that the subjects in the low load treatment re ‡ected on the decision longer than did the high load subjects. Finally, the result of regression (3) suggests that the low load subjects exhibited stronger learning across periods than did the subjects in the high load treatment, as demonstrated by the positive interaction term.
Note the relationship between Table 2 and regressions (1)-(3) in Table 1 . Indeed, in our view, the results of Table 2 suggest an explanation for the results of Table 1 . As previous research has indicated, the response time is associated with more strategic and less automatic reasoning. Therefore, the signi…cant, positive estimates of the period coe¢cients in Table 2 suggest that the subjects are becoming familiar with the game. This suggests an explanation for the observation of the convergence to the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium behavior.
The results of Table 2 also suggest that the low load subjects are becoming familiar with the game at a faster rate than the high load subjects. Again this suggests an explanation for the result that the individual behavior of subjects in the low load treatment were converging to the Subgame Perfect behavior at a faster rate than the high load subjects.
It is also interesting to note that, unlike Table 1 , Table 2 demonstrates a signi…cant relationship with the treatment dummy. In particular, we observe that subjects in the high load treatment were responding faster than the low load subjects. A possible explanation for this relationship is that the high load subjects exhibited a lower marginal bene…t of time thinking about the game, because of the more di¢cult memorization task, which they must subsequently complete. Therefore, these di¤erences provide an explanation for the observation that the high load subjects make their selection in the game at a faster rate.
Despite these di¤erences in individual behavior, the corresponding di¤erences for game outcomes were not signi…cantly di¤erent across treatments. In particular, we do not …nd the same di¤erential convergence of payo¤s as we did for choice. We perform the following regressions, with the payo¤s earned in the game as the dependent variable. For the purposes of the analysis below, we do not account for the accuracy in the memorization task. In other words, in the regressions below, we use the payo¤s which would have been earned had the memorization task been performed correctly. For this reason, we describe the dependent variable to be provisional payo¤s. Note that up to this point, we what now describe as provisional payo¤s, we referred to as game outcomes. We will henceforth use the term provisional payo¤s. In each regression below, we account for …xed-e¤ects and have n = 1800.
These regressions are summarized in Table 3 .
(1) We …nd that the provisional payo¤s were decreasing across periods. This result is not surprising because, as we found earlier, the individual behavior of the subjects was converging to the Subgame Perfect behavior. We also …nd that the low type dummy variable is not signi…cantly related to provisional payo¤s. Again, this is not surprising because we did not …nd the analogous relationship between the low type dummy and individual behavior.
However, what is surprising is that, the provisional payo¤s of the low treatment subjects do not converge at a rate di¤erent than that of the high load subjects. This is surprising because, in the individual behavior regressions, there was a strong di¤erence in the convergence of the high and low treatments. Also note that these relationships involving period, type, and period-type interaction are robust to accounting for the mixed nature of the groups and whether the subject correctly performed the memorization task in that period.
In both speci…cations involving the mixed group dummy, we see that there is a relationship between the mixed group variable and payo¤s which is marginally signi…cant. This suggests that subjects in mixed groups did better than subjects in homogenous groups. However, within these mixed groups, there was no di¤erence between the high and low treatments. In other words, conditional on being in a mixed group, those in the low load did not have a signi…cantly di¤erent provisional payo¤ than those in the high treatment. Finally, we note that the correct dummy is not signi…cantly related to provisional payo¤s.
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the results to this point, is the strong signi…cance of the period-type interaction in Tables 1 and 2, and its lack of signi…cance in Table 3 . On the one hand, we found that the individual behavior in the low load treatment converged to the Subgame Perfect behavior faster than those in the high load treatments. These results are found in Table 1 . On the other hand, we found that the analogous result did not hold for provisional payo¤s. Speci…cally, the provisional payo¤s of the high and low load treatments did not converge at a di¤erent rate. These results are found in the Table 3 . We now consider a possible explanation for these two seemingly dissonant results: perhaps the low load subjects were better able to condition on previous outcomes, and this extra agility o¤set the trend of playing uncooperatively.
In order to explore this explanation, we run …xed-e¤ects logistic regressions with choice as the dependent variable. As in the previous analysis, a 1 indicates that the cooperative action was selected and 0 indicates that that the uncooperative action was selected. As we hope to summarize the play in previous periods, we employ a variable which indicates the number of other players in the group who played cooperatively in the previous period. In other words, we compare the action selected in period t with the number of other group members who played cooperatively in period t 1. In the description below, we refer to this variable as Lagged Number of Others Playing X. Note that this variable can range from 0 to 3. Another possible measure of previous play is the change in cooperation between the previous period and the period preceding that. In other words, we compare the action selected in period t with the di¤erence in the number of other group members who played cooperatively in period t 1 and the number who played cooperatively in period t 2. We refer to this variable as
Lagged Change in Others Playing X. Note that this variable can range from 3 to 3. Finally, we include the three relevant interaction terms. In the regressions below, we account for …xed-e¤ects. Due to the nature of the lagged variables, regression (1) has n = 1740, and regressions (2) and (3) have n = 1680. The results are summarized in Table 4 .
(1) where * indicates signi…cance at 0.1, ** indicates signi…cance at 0.05, and *** indicates signi…cance at 0.01
In regression (1) we do not observe a signi…cant relationship. As previous analysis suggests, the treatment type is not related to choice. Also, we do not observe a relationship between choice and the number of others playing cooperatively in the previous period. Further there is not a signi…cant di¤erence between the sensitivity of the high load subjects to the number of others playing cooperatively in the previous period and the sensitivity of the low load subjects.
In regression (2), we observe a similar lack of signi…cance as that in regression (1). Again, we observe that the type variable is not signi…cantly related to choice. We observe that the lagged change in others playing cooperatively is not signi…cantly related to choice. Finally, we do not observe a signi…cant relationship between the sensitivity of the high load subjects
to the change in the cooperation and the sensitivity of the low load subjects.
However, in regression (3) signi…cant relationships emerge. Again, the cognitive load type variable is not signi…cant, nor are either of the measures of previous cooperation. But, we do observe a di¤erential sensitivity to both measures of previous cooperation. The low load types are more sensitive to the number of others playing cooperatively in the previous period than the high load types. Additionally, the low load types are also more sensitive to the change in the numbers of those playing cooperatively than the high load types.
Consider the signs of the variables indicating that the behavior of the low load subjects was more sensitive than that of the high load subjects to previous outcomes. We note that the interaction between the treatment and Number of Others Playing X is positive. This suggests that low load subjects are more likely than high load subjects to cooperate in response to a high level of cooperation in the previous period. We also note that interaction between the treatment and the Change in Others Playing X is negative. This suggests that low load subjects are more likely than high load subjects to play uncooperatively in response to an increase in cooperation between the previous period and the period preceding the previous period.
Although the lack of signi…cance in regressions (1) and (2) above, seems dissonant to the signi…cance in regression (3), intuition on the matter is relatively straightforward. Behavior is not exclusively a function of the level of cooperation in the previous period or exclusively a function of the change in the cooperation, but it is a function of both. Consider a subject making a decision regarding choice, where 2 of the 3 other subjects played cooperatively in the previous period. By itself, the number of cooperators in the previous period has no context, and is therefore not a su¢cient basis on which to make the choice. If the number of cooperators rose from 1 to 2, the decision maker would regard that as di¤erent from the situation in which the number of cooperators fell from 3 to 2. Therefore, signi…cant relationships only emerge when we consider the level of cooperation and the change in cooperation.
To further analyze the role of type in the sensitivity of choice to previous outcomes, we run the following …xed-e¤ects logistic regressions. In regression (1), we restrict to only the high load subjects. In regression (2) we restrict to only the low load subjects. The results are summarized in Table 5 .
(1) The results of regression (1) suggest that neither the number of others playing cooperatively in the previous period, nor the lagged change in others playing cooperatively, nor their interaction is signi…cantly related to choice for the high load types. By contrast, the results of regression (2) indicate that each of the variables attains some level of signi…cance. In particular, the number of others playing cooperatively is signi…cantly related to choice of the low load subjects at the 0:05 level. Further, the lagged change in others playing cooperatively is related to choice for the low load subjects at the 0:01 level. Together the results in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that the choice of the low load subjects was more sensitive to previous outcomes than the choice of the high load subjects.
We now test the robustness of the result that the low load subjects were more sensitive to previous play than the high load types. Although we …nd that the result is in general robust, we also …nd that in one speci…cation, the signi…cance is greatly reduced. Here we perform the identical analysis to that in summarized in Table 4 . However, here we also account for the mixed nature of the groups and the time e¤ects. In the regressions below, we account for …xed-e¤ects and have n = 1680. We summarize these results in Table 6 .
(1) In order to facilitate the robustness check, regression (1) in Table 6 is identical to regression (3) in Table 4 . Regression (2) accounts for the mixed nature of the groups, and the di¤erential sensitivity of the low subjects to previous play remains signi…cant. Regression
(3) also accounts for the period of the decision, and again the di¤erential sensitivity of the low subjects to previous play remains signi…cant. However, when we account for the mixed nature of the groups, the period and the period-type interaction, as we do in regression (4), we see that the di¤erential sensitivity of the low load types is diminished. In particular we see that the di¤erential sensitivity to the number of others playing cooperatively in the previous period is not signi…cant at any level. Further, the di¤erential sensitivity to the change in cooperation is only signi…cant at the 0:1 level.
Discussion
In the experiment described above, we found that behavior of both high and low load subjects in the multi-player prisoner's dilemma converged to the Subgame Perfect behavior. However, across all periods, we did not …nd a di¤erence in the behavior of the high and low treatments.
When we consider the time and the treatment then we note another signi…cant relationship:
the behavior of the low load subjects converged to the uncooperative Subgame Perfect prediction at a faster rate than did that of the high load subjects. However, when we perform the similar analysis, but with the provisional payo¤s, we note that there was no di¤erential convergence of game outcomes for the types.
One potential explanation for these two seemingly incongruent results is that low load subjects were better able to condition behavior on previous outcomes, and this agility o¤set the general trend towards the uncooperative outcomes. In particular, we found evidence that the low load subjects could, better than high load subjects, sustain cooperation when the level of cooperation in the previous period was high. We also found evidence that the low load subjects were more likely, than high load subjects, to play uncooperatively when there was an increase in the level of cooperation between the previous period and the period preceding that.
In other words, it seems that the low load subjects were better able to identify advantageous, temporary situations in which additional surplus could be captured.
So it seems that, while subjects in the high load treatments were more cooperative, and this would seem to imply higher provisional payo¤s, this bene…t of cooperation seems to have been o¤set by their reduced ability to condition actions on previous outcomes. The net result of these two e¤ects, which work in opposite directions, results in no signi…cant di¤erences in either the provisional payo¤s or the convergence rates of the provisional payo¤s.
Conclusion
So are there brains in games? And if so, what else can we say? Our results suggest a quali…ed yes to the …rst question. Given our manipulation of the availability of cognitive resources in our particular strategic environment, we found that di¤erences in cognitive resources imply di¤erences in strategic behavior.
Regarding the second question, the answer is somewhat delicate. We found that subjects within the low load treatment converged to the equilibrium prediction at a faster rate than did those under the high load. However, we found no di¤erences in the convergence of the payo¤s. To reconcile these two results, we note that the low load subjects were better able to condition their play on previous outcomes. This agility of the low load types seems to allow them to identify a temporary, advantageous situation and capture the available surplus. This agility seems to o¤set the e¤ect on payo¤s trend of playing uncooperatively.
There seem to be two ways to slice the results of the experiment. On the one hand, the reader who is not sympathetic to behavioral arguments, will point to the evidence of the convergence towards the Subgame Perfect behavior of both cognitive load treatments.
Indeed, we found that subjects, even in the high load treatment, exhibited behavior which converged to that predicted by the theory. This seems to support the claim that subjects, even those with diminished cognitive resources, will eventually learn from their mistakes and therefore intelligence is ultimately of limited concern in strategic settings. Further, the lack of signi…cance of the treatment dummy variable in the results involving choice or provisional payo¤s, could also be used to support the claim that the cognitive resources available to the subject is of limited interest in a strategic setting.
On the other hand, the reader who is more sympathetic to behavioral arguments will note that the di¤erences between the cognitive resources available to the subjects were directly related to the di¤erences in the rate of the convergence to the equilibrium behavior. Indeed, we found that the subjects in the low load treatment converged to the equilibrium behavior at a faster rate than did the subjects in the high load treatment. Further, we found evidence that the low load subjects were more sensitive than high load subjects to previous outcomes.
These results seem to o¤er support to the claim that the cognitive resources available to the subject are of interest in strategic settings. Despite the position of the reader, we hope that this experiment begins to clarify the role of cognitive resources in strategic settings.
The relationship between cognitive resources and play in games is also of interest to researchers who study nonequilibrium models. In response to the mounting evidence that subjects rarely play according to the equilibrium predictions, researchers turned their attention to nonequilibrium models which can account for errors made by subjects (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) or hierarchical levels of thinking (Camerer et. al., 2004; Costa-Gomes, et. al. 2001 ). It would seem natural to conclude that the intelligence of the subject would be related to either the errors committed or to the level of thinking employed by the subject. However, Georganas et. al. (2010) found that the mapping of measures of intelligence to the hierarchical level of thinking varies across games. While there could be other reasons for this negative result, 14 evidence of this kind is crucial in supporting existing nonequilibrium models or suggesting modi…cations to existing models. While the repeated nature of our present experiment does not allow a clean comparison to this literature, our paper suggests that it could be fruitful to investigate the relationship between the nonequilibrium models and the intelligence of subjects, through the application of a di¤erential cognitive load.
There remain several interesting and unanswered questions. For instance, it is unclear how the results would be a¤ected by a game other than the multi-player prisoner's dilemma.
For instance, it is unclear how the di¤erence in behavior of the treatments would be a¤ected by an increase (for instance, a public goods game or auction) or a decrease (for instance, a two-player prisoner's dilemma) in the computational di¢culty of the game. We hope that future work will examine the role of the complexity of the game.
Another unanswered question relates to the signi…cance of the incentives regarding the memorization task. While our cognitive load manipulation was successful, and we found no evidence of a relationship between choice and whether the memorization task was correct in that period, it is possible that the subjects exhibited an income e¤ect. In other words, since payment was only made when the memorization task was correct, and the memorization task for the high load types was more di¢cult, it is possible that the subjects acted di¤erently as a result of the …nancial incentives rather than the di¤erential cognitive resources. We also hope that future work can address the a¤ect of our incentives on our results.
Finally, note that we only applied a cognitive load during the stage in which the subjects selected an action in the game. We conjecture that our results would be strengthened if the load was applied during both the game decision stage and the feedback stage. However, only future work could test this conjecture.
